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Numerous studies conclude that declining turnout is harmful for 
democracy. However, we uncover the arguably positive effect that political 
parties become more responsive to the median voter in the election after 
turnout has decreased. We assume that parties are vote-seeking and show 
that moderate voters are responsible for changes in turnout, and we argue 
that declining turnout in an election sends a clear signal to political parties 
that there is an opportunity to mobilize disaffected voters in the following 
election by responding to changes in public opinion. We report the results 
of statistical analyses on data from thirteen democracies from 1977 to 2018 
that provide evidence that declining voter turnout in one inter-election 
period is associated with increasing party responsiveness to public opinion 
in the following period. Our findings have important implications for our 
understanding of voter turnout, political representation, and parties’ 




Several studies identify party responsiveness to shifts in public opinion as a 
key component in the representative process, and use this framework extensively to 
analyze policy linkages between citizens and parties over time (Dassonneville 2018; 
Ferland 2020; Homola 2019; Klüver and Spoon 2016; Spoon and Klüver 2014; Spoon 
and Klüver 2015; Williams and Spoon 2015). Prominent research in the discipline also 
recognizes the importance of electoral participation for democracy (e.g., Blais 2000; 
Franklin 2004; Lijphart 1997; see also Norris 2002). Discussing the importance of 
voting, Russell Dalton (2006, 42) states that “voting is the one activity that binds the 
individual to the political system and legitimizes the rest of the democratic process.” 
Democratic ideals suggest that policy preferences of citizens will translate into the 
selection of representatives who, in turn, produce policies (Powell 2000). These ideals 
assume that a participatory electorate is crucial for the functioning of democracy.  
 We examine the relationship between turnout and responsiveness by 
addressing the question: how do changes in turnout influence party responsiveness to 
the median voter? The empirical analyses of political parties in thirteen democracies 
from 1977 to 2018 support the finding that when voter turnout declines in an election, 
mainstream political parties are more responsive to shifts in the median voter position 
in the following election to appeal to disaffected voters. Thus, parties are sensitive to 
changes in turnout, however it is the decreases in turnout that then motivates political 
elites to respond to shifts in public opinion in the following election.  Indeed, there are 
recent cases which suggest that this occurs. In Germany, after a low turnout election 
in 2009, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) nominated centrist candidate Peer 
Steinbrück in 2013 as its leader in an attempt to appeal to moderate disaffected citizens 
 4 
in the “waiting room”1 that the party believed were ready to be mobilized.2 Mobilizing 
disaffected voters was a strategy also carried out in the 2010 UK election by the 
Conservatives (led by centrist leader David Cameron) when they managed to secure 
the largest share of citizens that had abstained in the previous election.3 
There are several reasons why our findings are important. First, they relate to 
the dynamic representation model of elections developed by Stimson, MacKuen, and 
Erikson (1995; Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002). This model identifies party 
responsiveness to shifts in public opinion as a key component in the representative 
process (see also the “thermostatic model” developed by Wlezien (1995; 1996)), and 
 
1 Translation by authors. Quoted from Süddeutsche Zeitung at 
https://www.sueddeutsche.de/1.1757398. 
2 Prior to the nomination, in the 2009 elections, German voter turnout decreased dramatically (to 
70.8%) with the SPD suffering a catastrophic 11% decrease in its vote share from 2005. During the 
election campaign, the SPD leadership repeatedly underlined the need to mobilize citizens that had 
abstained in the 2009 elections. In fact, the SPD leadership openly speculated that if turnout increased 
5-7 percentage points, the party could gain the most votes in the upcoming election. Steinbrück 
claimed that the party’s past vote loss was not due to voters switching, and instead that former SPD 
voters could be mobilized. In the aftermath of the 2009 turnout decline, we can interpret the 2013 
SPD’s leadership selection and their public comments as a clear attempt to gain votes by appealing to 
centrist citizens that had abstained in the previous election. See, e.g., reports in the newspapers Welt 
(https://www.welt.de/article120085169) or Focus (https://www.focus.de/_aid_1029828.html). 




several comparative scholars have also focused on this linkage between citizens and 
parties over time (e.g., Adams et al. 2004; Soroka and Wlezien 2010).4   
Second, the study relates to the empirical and theoretical studies of parties’ 
election strategies (e.g., Dow 2001; Dow 2011; Downs 1957; Somer-Topcu 2015; 
Spoon 2011), and more specifically scholars have identified “decision rules” for 
parties that seek office facing uncertainty in elections and difficulty in calculating 
optimal strategies (e.g., Budge 1994; Laver 2005). These studies develop on arguments 
that parties rely on heuristics or “shortcuts” to deal with circumstances of complexity 
and uncertainty. Virtually all of these studies consider the possibility that parties’ past 
election results or rival parties’ positions inform the decision rules that parties use to 
adopt policy in the current election (Budge 1994; Laver 2005; Adams and Somer-
Topcu 2009a; Somer-Topcu 2009; Budge et al. 2010; see also Lindvall et al. 2021). 
This study is the first to connect current party policy strategies to previous turnout, 
i.e., that parties also incorporate information about changing voter turnout in 
formulating their future electoral strategies.  
Third, the study raises implications for our understanding of the effects of 
turnout. Cross-national empirical studies of voter turnout have shown that high levels 
of turnout are associated with high levels of citizen satisfaction with democracy (e.g., 
Anderson and Guillory 1997; Franklin 2004; Hobolt 2012).5 Here it is shown that 
 
4 The studies that analyze mean voter representation and dynamic representation are similar in that they 
are each concerned with how elites represent citizens. However, mean voter representation and dynamic 
representation differ in that the former concept focuses on the party-citizen linkage in elections, while 
the latter refers to responsiveness of government policy outputs.  
5 Ezrow and Xezonakis (2016) argue that if the relationship between citizen satisfaction and voter 
turnout is analyzed within countries and over time, that decreases in citizen satisfaction with democracy 
will lead to increases in voter turnout.  
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turnout changes have clear effects for parties’ policy positions and their sensitivity to 
shifts in public opinion.   
Fourth, and related, the study identifies an additional normative standard for 
measuring the health of democracy. As noted, scholars widely view voter turnout as a 
bellwether for assessing the health of democracy. The implication of virtually all 
studies of political participation and turnout is that elites will be more responsive to 
voters when they anticipate high levels of turnout. Yet, the finding that is reported here 
is that turnout decline and party responsiveness are related. In this light, the importance 
of the study is to generate a focus on whether decreasing turnout is met with a 
subsequent increase in party responsiveness. Put differently, if parties remain 
unresponsive to the median voter position after turnout decreases, this could signal 
that policy linkages between parties and citizens are deteriorating. Turnout should not 
only be seen as an expression of satisfaction with democracy and institutions, but also 
as a mechanism to signal an absence of responsiveness to the median. Declines in 
turnout often have a “silver lining” in that they prompt parties to be more attentive to 
future shifts in public opinion.  
 
Declining Turnout and Increasing Party Responsiveness 
We assume that parties are vote-seeking and that the largest changes in turnout 
patterns occur among moderate voters (Rodon 2017). Declining turnout in a focal 
election sends a clear signal to political parties to respond to the median voter in an 
effort to mobilize disaffected voters for the next election. This expectation is based on 
numerous studies that report that when parties appeal to citizens in terms of policy 
they will be more likely to turnout to vote (see, e.g., Adams et al. 2006a; Dreyer and 
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Bauer 2019; Plane and Gershtenson 2004; Lefkofridi et al. 2014; Reher 2014; Hobolt 
and Hoerner 2020).  
Persuasive arguments suggest that shifts in the median voter position will 
influence parties’ policy shifts because they seek to maximize votes. Prominent 
researchers of mainstream parties have observed that these parties have expanded their 
range of ideological appeals, and that they have shed their “ideological baggage” 
(Kirchheimer 1966; see also Kitschelt 1997; Van Kersbergen 1997). The result is that 
mainstream parties are sensitive to shifts in public opinion (e.g., Adams et al. 2004). 
Maximizing votes may not be an end goal in itself: vote-maximization is an efficient 
strategy for office- and policy-seeking parties (see Müller and Strøm 1999). For an 
office-seeking party in a multiparty system, increased vote shares enhance its position 
for post-election coalition negotiations. In the latter case, for a policy-seeking party, 
its leverage to pull the governing coalition’s policy in its preferred direction will 
increase as its electoral strength increases as well.6 Thus there are persuasive 
theoretical arguments to suggest that parties – whether they are vote-, office-, or 
policy-seeking – will be responsive to changes in the median voter position in the 
general electorate (see, e.g., Adams and Merrill 2009; Downs 1957; Huber and Powell 
1994; McDonald and Budge 2005; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 2002).7  
 
6 Adams and Merrill’s (2009) theoretical study on policy-seeking parties’ strategies in multiparty 
systems concludes that parties are motivated to adjust their policy strategies in response to their beliefs 
about the median voter’s position, rather than in response to the diversity of voter ideologies in the 
electorate.  
7 Informational considerations suggest that mainstream parties will respond to the mean voter position. 
Since these parties occupy the “crowded center”, mainstream parties are unable to differentiate their 
supporters from other mainstream party supporters. In this environment, they might receive clear policy 
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If turnout decisions are based on how close citizens are to the most proximate 
party in policy terms (Adams et al. 2006a; Dreyer and Bauer 2019; Plane and 
Gershtenson 2004; Lefkofridi et al. 2014; Reher 2014; Hobolt and Hoerner 2020), 
political parties will be more sensitive to the left-right preference of the median voter 
after voter turnout decreases. Previous turnout decline signals that there are more 
moderate disaffected voters that may potentially vote in the following election. One 
reason why parties appeal to moderates in these circumstances is because there are 
typically more voters in the middle than there are at the extremes (see Adams and 
Somer-Topcu 2009b). Furthermore, the variation in individual turnout is lower at the 
extremes. Distinctly non-centrist voters tend to also hold higher intensity of ideology 
(Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989), and these citizens (of which there are fewer) tend 
to be more interested and passionate about politics (Adams and Ezrow 2009). 
Furthermore, these voters have been found to be more stable in their vote intention at 
the national level (Dassonneville 2012), and they report voting at higher rates than 
moderate voters.  
The arguments summarized above are consistent with the findings of Rodon 
(2017) who reports stark empirical differences in voter turnout between moderates and 
other voters. In particular, he attributes the difference due to partisanship levels that 
are much weaker in the center than to the left or right. Rodon (2017, 150) writes on 
partisanship levels for the center, left, and right, “the erosion of party attachments has 
affected all voters, but this has been unequally distributed across ideological positions. 
Data collected in this article shows that, on average, the percentage of non-partisan 
identifiers are higher on the center (48.4%) than on the left (31.3%) or the right 
 
signals from the electorate as a whole (e.g., through polling) rather than from other subconstituencies 
like party supporters (Ezrow et al. 2011; but see Ibenskas and Polk 2019).  
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(33.2%).” He also reports that low partisanship levels in the middle has the predictable 
consequence that turnout is lower for moderate citizens.8 
Although the aforementioned studies are insightful and lend preliminary 
support to the claim that changes in centrist citizens’ turnout rates drive overall 
changes in turnout, to the best of our knowledge no study has directly tested whether 
this actually occurs. Since our argument about party responsiveness to public opinion 
hinges on this assumption, we report findings in the empirical section that supports the 
finding that changes in rates of turnout are predominantly driven by changes in centrist 
citizens’ turnout decisions. 
The theoretical expectation that political parties will be more responsive to 
public opinion after elections that exhibited a decrease in voter turnout may also vary 
across types of political parties.9  For example, some parties may even further 
prioritize vote- or office-seeking such as “dominant” parties, i.e., parties that have 
previously governed, when compared to the “challenger” parties that have not (De 
Vries and Hobolt 2020). In a similar vein, Klüver and Spoon (2016) and Meguid (2005, 
 
8 Research on second order elections, such as those to the European Parliament, is insightful in this 
regard as these elections are characterized by an unusually low turnout compared with national 
elections. Franklin (2007) shows that left-right extremism has a positive effect on participation in the 
elections to the European Parliament; suggesting that centrist voters in particular abstained in these low 
turnout elections. A recent study by Remer-Bollow, Bernhagen, and Rose (2019) addresses to what 
extent the results of the European elections would have changed if turnout had risen to the level observed 
in first-order national elections. They note that ideologically left-wing and moderate parties would have 
performed better under the condition of a higher turnout. Therefore, it is parties that rely on the vote of 
centrist voters that would have benefited from increased voter turnout. 
9  We thank two of the journal’s reviewers for encouraging us to explore party type effects in our 
analyses.  
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2008) analyze how mainstream and niche parties represent voters differently (see also 
Bischof and Wagner 2019). Bawn and Somer-Topcu (2012) report different election 
strategies for governing and opposition parties. Relatedly, vote-losing and vote-
gaining parties have different incentives to change their policy positions (Somer-
Topcu 2009). Possibly, other party distinctions matter, such as whether they are 
centrist or extreme, or large or small. The empirical section reports analyses that 
suggest that the theory applies to most of these parties, and that significant differences 
only occur in few instances (for challengers and extreme parties). The theory thus has 
implications for which party types are “center-oriented” and hence more responsive to 
previous changes in turnout.  
To summarize, the above discussion of party type effects notwithstanding, 
political parties will seek to mobilize moderate voters after elections that are 
characterized by relatively low voter turnout by appealing to them in policy terms. 
The discussion above motivates the following hypothesis:  
 
H1 (The Declining Turnout Hypothesis): Decreases in turnout increase party 
responsiveness to the median voter position in the following election.  
Exploring this hypothesis enhances our understanding of party competition, 
and if it is supported it suggests that an important underemphasized effect of decreased 
turnout is increased party responsiveness to public opinion in the following election.  
Data and Measurement 
To test whether changes in turnout influence party responsiveness we develop 
longitudinal, cross-national measures of voter turnout, the median (or mean) voter 
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position,10 and parties’ policy positions. Our cases include West European 
democracies for which Eurobarometer mean voter data are available. Countries and 
years include Austria (1999-2017), Denmark (1977-2015), Finland (2003-2015), 
France (1981-2017), Germany (1980-2017), Great Britain (1979-2017), Greece (1985-
2015), Ireland (1981-2016), Italy (1983-2018), The Netherlands (1981-2017), 
Portugal (1991-2015), Spain (1989-2016), and Sweden (2002-2018).11 
 
The Dependent Variable: Parties’ Left-Right Policy Positions 
Our primary measure of party shifts is from statements from party platforms as 
provided by the CMP/MARPOR researchers (Klingemann et al. 2006; Volkens et al. 
2018). Party positions (and voter preferences described below) are measured in terms 
of “left” and “right.” To capture important temporal changes in party position, we 
employ a panel of elections from thirteen countries ranging from 1977 to 2018. 
Comprised of the election manifestos from political parties in a wide range of 
democracies, these data provide cross-national estimates of party policies available for 
an extended time period. And since the content of party programs is often the result of 
intense intra-party debate, the MARPOR estimates should be reliable and accurate 
 
10 The mean of respondents’ self-placements is a reasonable approximation of the median because the 
distributions of respondents’ self-placements are generally unimodal and symmetric (Adams and 
Somer-Topcu 2009b, p. 682). Ward et al. (2011, fn. 50) report a correlation of 0.969 between estimates 
of the mean and median. The analyses of Powell (2021) further corroborate that when the distribution 
of citizen self-placements is characterized as normal, there are only slight differences between the use 
of the mean and the interpolated median.    
11 Belgium and Luxembourg are not included because these are compulsory voting countries. When 
these countries are included in the empirical analyses, however, the substantive conclusions do not 
change. Malta is omitted due to insufficient median voter data.  
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statements about parties’ positions at the time of elections. Research has found these 
measures to be generally consistent with those from other party positioning studies, 
such as those based upon expert placements, citizen perceptions of parties’ positions, 
and parliamentary voting analyses (Laver et al. 2003; Marks 2007; McDonald and 
Mendes 2001; see also Adams et al. 2019). We measure left-right positions using the 
logit transformed scales advocated by Lowe et al. (2011).12 The measure has an 
empirical maximum value of 4.6 (extreme right) and a minimum of -4.5 (extreme left). 
The dependent variable, ∆"#$%&	"()*%*(+	(%), is then measured as the change in party 
position from election t-1 to t. Table A3 in the Supporting Information reports all of 
the parties that are included in the analysis. 
 
Independent Variables: Changes in Voter Turnout, the Mean Voter Position, and their 
Interaction 
To test the Declining Turnout Hypothesis, it is necessary to measure voter 
turnout. Most comparative studies of turnout emphasize the importance of cross-
national comparability of the measure. Given the longitudinal nature of this study, it 
is important that our measure of turnout is consistent over time, within each country. 
The longitudinal measure of voter turnout for our sample is from a dataset provided 




12 Our results do not change if we use the additive measure as proposed by Laver and Budge (1992) 
which ranges from -100 to +100. 
13 This data set includes turnout estimates that have been officially reported by the countries’ national 
election commissions.  
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Figure 1: Voter Turnout, 1977-2018 
 
Notes: The turnout estimates are based on the percentages of eligible voters. The time periods 
correspond to the coverage by the Eurobarometer surveys (see below). 
 
 
Estimates of the turnout variable, stratified by country, are presented in Figure 
1. The dots represent turnout levels for each election that is included in the empirical 
analyses, and there are several important patterns to identify. Few countries have 
constant turnout rates. In France, Portugal, and Italy, participation rates have declined 
consistently since the 1990s. Other countries such as Denmark, the Netherlands, or 
Spain show fluctuating trends where turnout decreases and increases alternate. Last, 
in some countries downward trends have been met with an upward movement, 
particularly in the most recent elections under study (e.g., Austria, Germany, the 
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United Kingdom, and Sweden). Overall, there is no common trend that applies to every 
European country.14  
Data on mean voter preferences come from the Eurobarometer public opinion 
surveys that ask respondents to place themselves on a left-right scale from 1 (left) to 
10 (right). We focus on voters’ (and political parties’) left-right positions instead of 
more detailed conflict dimensions for two reasons. First, comparative survey data for 
citizens’ positions on subdimensions of political conflict (such as the economy or 
cultural issues) is scarce. Hence, only left-right positions are available for a broad set 
of countries over extended time periods. Second, and more importantly, recent 
research suggests that voters’ economic and cultural preferences are nonseparable. As 
a consequence, left-right congruence between voters and parties is the stronger 
predictor of vote choice if compared with congruences on political subdimensions 
(Lichteblau et al. 2020; see also Lachat 2018).  
As the Eurobarometer does not survey at the exact time of national elections 
and instead bi-annually, we consider only those surveys that were conducted at 
maximum one year before the election in question.15 Figure 2 gives an overview of the 
distribution of the mean voter position for all countries under observation. Some 
countries have seen considerable variation in mean voter positions over time. For 
instance, the position of the mean voter in Ireland has moved from 6.2 in 1981 to 5.12 
in 2016. Similar levels of variation are observable in other countries such as Germany, 
 
14 There are limitations of scope based on the coverage of the Eurobarometer surveys. In particular, the 
(shortened) time series of Austria, Spain, Finland, Greece, Portugal, and Sweden is due to these 
countries entering the dataset as they became members of the European Union.  
15 As a consequence, we exclude from our analysis all snap elections that took place less than six months 
after the previous election. 
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Italy, or the United Kingdom. Other countries like Finland exhibit less variation over 
time. 
 
Figure 2: Mean Voter Positions, 1975-2018 
 
Notes: Mean voter position estimates are based on Eurobarometer surveys that ask 
respondents to place themselves on a left-right scale from 1 (left) to 10 (right). The boxplots 
report mean voter positions for each country election included in the study. The boxes show 
the interquartile ranges of the mean voter positions, with the middle line in each box 
showing median values. The ends of the whiskers are minimum and maximum values. 
 
 
Testing Centrist Turnout as a Driver of Overall Turnout 
 
Before we evaluate the Declining Turnout Hypothesis, we first test the crucial 
assumption that changes in a country’s turnout are affected by changes in turnout 
among moderate voters. We test for this relationship by making use of election 
studies provided by the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), which 
comprises post-election surveys for the majority of West European countries since 
1996 (CSES 2018; 2020). Relying on a question asking survey respondents whether 
they turned out to vote in the most recent general election, we estimate the 
parameters of multilevel logit model specifications for the 39 elections in the 13 
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countries that are covered in the analyses of party responsiveness below.  We 
estimate random effects for each country and each survey (Schmidt-Catran and 
Fairbrother 2016), and we use CSES design and sample weights. We estimate a 
respondent’s left-right extremism score by calculating the distance between her left-
right position and the rounded mean voter position. This measure takes the value of 0 
if the respondents’ left-right position is identical to the mean voter position. The 
higher the value, the greater is the distance to the mean voter position, and the 
maximum value of the resulting scale is 6. The results are similar if we use a binary 
indicator for centrist (distance 0-1) and non-centrist (distance 2-6) respondents, and 
these are reported in the Supporting Information (Table A2 and Figure A1). We 
further add a variable at the election level which denotes the change in turnout 
between the election in question and the previous election. Interacting the variables 
allows us to evaluate centrist individual turnout probabilities in contexts of declining 
turnout, and then to compare it to estimates for more extreme citizens. 
 
 reports the corresponding regression results. Models 1 and 2 evaluate 
whether left-right extremism influences a citizen’s probability of voting independent 
of overall turnout. Model 2 includes a series of additional individual-level covariates 
that are likely to affect citizens’ voting behavior.16 These controls include socio-
demographic characteristics (age, gender, education, household income, union 
membership, and employment status) as well as attitudinal variables (external 
political efficacy and satisfaction with the working of democracy).  
 
16 For the full set of regression results, see Table A1 in the Appendix. The estimated effects of the 
control variables are in the expected direction and statistically significant (with the exception of 
gender). 
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Table 1: Citizen Ideology, Turnout, and Changes in Turnout  
Individual-Level Analyses 
 
 DV: Turnout (Individual-Level) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Left-Right Extremism [0-6] .090*** .102*** . .073*** .088*** 
 (.025) (.021) (.023) (.020) 
Δ Turnout (Election Level)   .071*** .061** 
   (.026) (.025) 
Left-Right Ext. *Δ Turnout   -.012** -.010** 
   (.005) (.004) 
Controls No Yes No  Yes 
Random Effects (Country and Survey) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N Countries 13 13 13 13 
N Country-Years 42 42 42 42 
Var(Countries) .268 .140 .248 .137 
 (.208) (.124) (.174) (.104) 
Var(Country-Years) .271*** .295*** .230*** .265*** 
     (.090) (.093) (.062) (.078) 
N 48442 48442 48442 48442 
Log likelihood -16103.1 -15099.0 -16092.9 -15092.1 
Note: ***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1 
Data: CSES IMD and CSES 5. Sample and demographic weights used. 
Left-Right Extremism: Distance to rounded mean voter position. 
 
The positive coefficients on left-right extremism confirm that the probability 
of voting increases for more extreme citizens, which is consistent with previous 
research (Rodon 2017). Next, Models 3 and 4 report the left-right extremism 
coefficients that are conditional on changes in turnout. The interaction effect is 
negative which suggests that centrist voters do not only abstain more often but that 
the gap between the abstention of centrist and extreme voters widens in elections 
with declining turnout. If declining turnout were not driven by centrist abstention, the 
estimate on the interaction variable would be insignificant, and the probability of 
voting would decline uniformly for all voters. 
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Figure 3: Predicted Probabilities of Voting Based on Individual-Level 
Analyses
 
Note: Confidence bands show 95% confidence intervals. Estimates based on Model 3 in Table 1. 
 
Figure 3 clearly depicts this finding using predicted probabilities comparing 
centrist and extreme citizens. In elections with increasing turnout, the probability of 
voting is nearly identical for all voters independent of their distance to the mean 
voter position.  If turnout decreases, however, the likelihood of voting only decreases 
for centrist citizens. Alternatively, turnout change has no discernable effect on voting 
for extreme citizens. As a consequence, the models indicate that declining turnout is 
to a substantial extent driven by centrist citizens deciding to abstain. Conversely, 
increasing turnout is marked by centrist citizens deciding to turnout.  We note that 
the effect sizes should be interpreted with caution as survey respondents overstate 
their turnout likelihood in pre- and post-election surveys. Nevertheless, the results 
indicate that the effect for centrist citizens is substantively significant, because the 
gap in the probability of voting between centrist and extreme respondents varies 
between 5 and 10 percentage points depending on the size of the negative turnout 
change. We thus find support for the finding that changes in centrist turnout drive 
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overall turnout changes, which is part of the central argument that political parties 
have a strong incentive to respond to moderate (disaffected) voters in times after 
declining turnout. On this basis we proceed.   
 
Testing the Declining Turnout Hypothesis 
Recall that the Declining Voter Turnout Hypothesis predicts that parties will 
respond to changes in the mean voter position in the election after an election that has 
experienced a decrease in voter turnout. We estimate parameters of “cross-national” 
OLS regression models to evaluate whether this relationship between responsiveness 
and turnout is present in our data. This “cross-national” specification is:  
 
where ∆ Party Position (t) is defined as the difference in a party’s left-right position at 
election t, from its position at the previous election at (t-1). ∆	Mean Voter (t) denotes 
the difference in the position of the mean voter in the current election t, from the mean 
voter in the previous election at (t-1). The lagged ∆ Turnout (t-1) variable is defined 
as the difference between turnout in the previous election (t-1) from turnout two 
elections ago (t-2). Moreover, we added country fixed effects (.) to control for time-
constant factors (such as electoral system characteristics). Finally, / denotes a vector 
of time-varying covariates, and 0 is the error term. 
We add a number of covariates, which potentially influence changes in parties’ 
left-right positions. First, the change in a party’s vote share may have an influence. In 
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∆"#$%&	"()*%*(+	(%) = 	/! 		
+ /"[∆	23#+	4(%3$	(%)]
+	/#[∆	67$+(7%	(% − 1)]
+	/$[∆	23#+	4(%3$	(%)] ∗ [∆	67$+(7%	(% − 1)]
+	/%; + < + =, 
 
where ∆ Party Position (t) is defined as the difference in a party’s left-right position at 
election t, from its position at the previous election at (t-1). ∆	Mean Voter (t) denotes the 
difference in the position of the mean voter in the current election t, from the mean voter in 
the previous election at (t-1). The lagged ∆ Turnout (t-1) variable is defined as the difference 
between turnout in the previous election (t-1) from turnout two elections ago (t-2). Moreover, 
we added country fixed effects (<) to control for time-constant factors (such as electoral 
system characteristics). Finally, ; denotes a vector of time-varying covariates for which all 
are also differenced variables, and = is the error term. 
We add a number of covariates, which potentially influence the expected conditioning 
effect of the lagged turnout variable on party responsiveness. First, the change in a party’s 
vote share may influence this relationship. In particular, previous election results might con-
stitute different incentives for parties to respond to the mean voter position. For example, the 
literature on decision rules suggest that vote-winning parties might be inclined to shift in the 
same direction as in the previous election and vote-losing parties might strategically decide to 
switch into the opposite direction (Budge 1994; Adams et al. 2004; Somer-Topcu 2009). We 
thus control for parties’ vote changes at t-1.  
Second, parties in government – constrained by the responsibility of policy- and deci-
sion-making – might be restricted in their flexibility to respond to public opinion in order to 
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particular, previous election results might constitute different incentives for parties to 
respond to the mean voter position. For example, the literature on decision rules 
suggest that vote-winning parties might be inclined to shift in the same direction as in 
the previous election and vote-losing parties might strategically decide to switch into 
the opposite direction (Adams et al. 2004; Budge 1994; Somer-Topcu 2009). We thus 
control for parties’ vote changes at t-1.  
Second, parties in government – constrained by the responsibility of policy- 
and decision-making – might be restricted in their flexibility to respond to public 
opinion in order to maintain their programmatic credibility in the face of previous 
government decisions. Accordingly, we include parties’ governing status (i.e., 
governing or opposition) in the model specification. Third, macro-economic factors 
possibly restrain parties’ ability to maneuver as parties potentially refrain from 
proposing positions that are considered unrealistic under economic globalization 
(Hellwig 2014). We add a measure of the difference in economic globalization from 
the current election and the previous election, provided by the KOF Globalization 
Index (Sturm, Haelg, and Gygli 2018).17 Lastly, economic performance could 
influence party responsiveness. It has been shown that if the economy performs well, 
parties tend to promote more rightist economic policies if compared with periods when 
the economy slows down. As a result, we control for the log-transformed change in 
GDP per capita (World Bank 2018) between t-1 and t. 
In total, we estimate a first-difference model that focuses on the changes in our 
independent variables on the changes in parties’ left-right positions. Focusing on 
 
17 Results from previous research also suggest that party responsiveness is enhanced when the country’s 
economy is sufficiently sheltered from the world economy (Ezrow and Hellwig 2014; see also Haupt 
2010).  
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changes makes sense theoretically when investigating party responsiveness, and using 
a first-difference model comes with the advantage of addressing several common 
problems related to working with (quasi-)panel data. In particular, it addresses the 
stationarity of the time-series, and party- and country-specific heterogeneity. Still, 
serial correlation remains a possibility. Accordingly, we add a lagged dependent 
variable to the regression equation (Beck and Katz 1995).18 Moreover, the error terms 
might be correlated within units (parties) or time (elections), which could yield 
unreliable standard errors. We cluster the standard errors based on both types, parties 




The parameter estimates for the cross-national specifications are presented in Models 
1a and 1b of Table 2. Model 1a presents the regression results without an interaction 
term to evaluate whether parties generally tend to respond to public opinion shifts. We 
retest this hypothesis as previous studies have mostly tested for this relationship with 
much shorter time series (until 2002). As can be seen, the effect of the ∆	Mean Voter 
(t) variable is positive and statistically significant. This indicates that political parties 
indeed tend to respond to shifts in the mean voter position. This speaks well to previous 
findings showing that there is a close correspondence between parties’ policy and 
public opinion shifts (see Adams 2012 for an overview). Model 1b includes an 
interaction term between turnout change and shifts in the Mean Voter Position and 
thus tests for the relationship of interest of this paper. As expected, the interaction term 
 
18 Omitting this variable from the models does not affect the results. 
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is negative and statistically significant supporting the idea that party responsiveness 
diminishes in times of increasing turnout. 
 
Table 2: Analyses of Changes in Party Position 
 DV: Party Position (t) 
 Model 1a Model 1b 
   
Δ Party Left-Right Position (t-1) -.389*** -.393*** 
 (.070) (.068) 
Δ Mean Voter (t) .385*** .292** 
 (.143) (.140) 
Δ Turnout (t-1) .008 .004 
 (.008) (.007) 
Δ Party Vote Share (t-1) .077 .040 
 (.374) (.365) 
Party Opposition Status (t-1) .003 .010 
 (.050) (.050) 
Δ Globalization (t) -.025 -.021 
 (.025) (.025) 
Δ GDP per Capita (log, t) -.221 -.246 
 (.294) (.275) 
Δ Mean Voter (t) * Δ Turnout (t-1)  -.075*** 
  (.025) 
Constant -.314 -.286 
 (.215) (.202) 
N 651 651 
R-squared .186 .196 
***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1 
 
Notes: The dependent variable D Party Position (t) is defined as the difference in 
a party’s left-right position at election t, from its position at the previous election 
at (t-1). The independent variables are defined in the text. Two-way clustered 








Figure 4: Effect of Mean Voter Shifts on Changes in Party Position, 
Conditional on the Lagged Change in Voter Turnout 
 
Notes: The figure charts the estimated coefficient of D Mean Voter (t) on D Party Position (t) 
over values of D Turnout (t-1), as provided by Table 2 Model 1b estimates. The dashed lines 
report 95% confidence intervals. The dot plot shows the distribution of the turnout values. 
Omitting cases with values for D Turnout (t-1) that are greater than +5% or less than -5% does 
not change the substantive results. 
 
 
Figure 4 depicts marginal effects to interpret the interaction term, and it 
supports the finding that political parties tend to be highly responsive in times of 
declining turnout. This effect however is conditional on the magnitude of the turnout 
change. When the value of ∆ Turnout (t-1) drops below zero (approximately) 
indicating that turnout decreased in the previous inter-election period, the effect of ∆ 
Mean Voter (t) on ∆ Party Position (t) is positive and statistically significant. These 
coefficient estimates of party responsiveness to the mean voter position increase, as 
the lagged turnout variable decreases in value. By contrast, the effect of the ∆ Mean 
Voter (t) variable on the ∆ Party Position (t) variable becomes smaller and 
insignificant, for positive and increasing values on the lagged turnout variable. Hence, 
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the analysis supports the finding that decreasing levels of turnout are met with 
increasing party responsiveness in the following election.19 
The conditional effects that are estimated for the ∆ Mean Voter (t) variable are 
also important because they suggest that the relationship between public opinion shifts 
and shifts by political parties is one in which the parties respond to public opinion, 
instead of one in which public opinion responds to parties (or where both parties and 
the public respond independently to an external factor not accounted for in our 
specification).20 If citizens change their preferences in response to parties’ policy shifts 
this should affect the ∆ Mean Voter (t) variable similarly across values of the ∆ Turnout 
(t-1) variable. However, the coefficient on the ∆ Mean Voter (t) variable is only 
positive and statistically significant under circumstances in which the preceding 
change in turnout was negative. These estimates are not consistent with a causal 






19 The marginal effects are similar to those presented if we follow the guidance of Hainmueller, 
Mummolo, and Xu (2019), by relaxing the linearity assumption of the interaction effect, and applying 
a kernel estimator. See Figure A2 in the Supporting Information. 
20 There are persuasive studies that suggest that voters update their policy preferences based on their 
preferred parties’ policy stances (Achen and Bartels 2016; Lenz 2012). 
21 In addition, Table A13 in the Supporting Information estimates changes in parties’ left-right 
positions, and the mean voter variable included in these model specifications is measured based on 
observations from 4-12 months prior to the election.  If parties are uniformly influencing public 
opinion during campaigns just before elections, the expectation is that estimates on changes in the 
mean voter variable would become significantly smaller using this lagged measure. However, the 
reported estimates are roughly the same.    
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Differential Effects Across Party Groups 
 
Previous research has indicated that not all parties tend to respond to the mean 
voter to the same extent. Different party types have been assumed to be constrained 
by their programmatic structure or the composition of their supporters and, thus, to be 
less attentive to shifts in the positions of the mean voter. De Vries and Hobolt (2020), 
for instance, propose that parties that had government experience in the past should be 
encouraged to prioritize vote- or office-seeking goals, while challenger parties are 
expected to politicize new issues rather than cater to the center of the left-right 
dimension (see also De Vries and Hobolt 2012). As a consequence, we expect 
challenger parties to pay less attention to the mean voter position even when voter 
turnout has previously decreased.  Similarly, smaller parties with less electoral support 
should be inclined to focus on particular subgroups in the electorate rather than shifts 
in the mean voter position. Niche parties, such as radical left, radical right, green, and 
ethno-territorial parties, have been found to represent voters who care about single 
policy issues (Adams et al. 2006b; Klüver and Spoon 2016; Meguid 2005, 2008). As 
a consequence, niche parties might be less incentivized to focus on broader shifts in 
the electorate. Also, we might expect that the electoral support of extreme parties is 
not dependent on centrist voters so that these parties should be less attentive to the 
mean voter. Bawn and Somer-Topcu (2012) have argued that election strategies differ 
for governing and opposition parties, and this distinction could potentially matter for 
our results. Lastly, political parties that have experienced vote losses in a previous 
election are expected to be less risk averse and, thus, more inclined to change their 
policy positions (Janda et al. 1995; Somer-Topcu 2009). We provide information on 
the exact operationalization of these variables in the Supporting Information. 
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We test for the differential responsiveness for all of these party types by adding 
three-way interactions to the main model presented in Table 2. Table 3 shows the 
corresponding regression results and the marginal effects plots can be found in the SI 
(Figure A3). Note that the standard errors need to be interpreted with caution due to 
small group sizes in some specifications. The coefficients of Δ Mean Voter Position 
(t) * Δ Turnout (t-1) show the marginal effect for those party groups coded as “0” and 
the three-way interaction, Δ Mean Voter Position (t) * Δ Turnout (t-1) * Party Type, 
estimate whether the effect is conditioned by party groups coded as “1”. 
Overall, we find support for the idea that challenger parties as defined by De 
Vries and Hobolt (2020) are less responsive to the mean voter position. The three-way 
interaction in model 1 is positive and statistically significant at the .05 level, which 
implies that challenger parties pay less attention to the mean voter position even when 
voter turnout decreases (Figure A3.1 in the SI confirms this interpretation). A similar 
effect is visible for extreme parties which seems plausible as we might expect that 
most challenger parties are also political parties with more extreme positions on the 
left-right scale. For the remaining party groups, the three-way interaction estimates are 
insignificant. The corresponding marginal effects that estimate the conditioning effects 
of previous turnout on party responsiveness is not significantly different for governing 
and oppositions parties, large and small parties, or for parties who lost or gained 
electoral support in the previous election. The triple interaction effect for niche parties 
is also insignificant. One set of arguments suggests that these “ideological” parties 
have been shown to respond more to their supporters than to the mean voter position 
(Ezrow et al. 2011). However, recent research suggests that the programmatic 
“nicheness” of parties is a dynamic rather than a manifest feature of parties. In 
particular, larger and older niche parties are expected to focus on voter groups beyond 
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their core supporters (see, e.g., Bergman and Flatt 2019; De Vries and Hobolt 2020), 
and could thus be more responsive to shifts in the mean voter position. Our estimates 
corroborate this latter set of findings.  
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Table 3: Empirical Analyses of Different Party Types 































Extreme (1)  
vs.  
Non-Extreme (0) 
   
Δ Mean Voter Position (t) .268* .206 .531** .343** .194 .268* 
 (.161) (.150) (.211) (.168) (.140) (.139) 
Δ Turnout (t-1) .001 -.001 -.008 .010 .005 .009 
 (.010) (.009) (.012) (.009) (.008) (.008) 
Party Type  -.057 -.037 .014 .046 -.025 -.060 
 (.068) (.062) (.049) (.048) (.059) (.061) 
Δ Mean Voter Position (t) * Δ Turnout (t-1) -.095*** -.065** -.070** -.070*** -.090*** -.092*** 
 (.027) (.029) (.034) (.026) (.023) (.024) 
Δ Mean Voter Position (t) * Party Type .113 .214 -.399 -.112 .235 .179 
   (.291) (.302) (.255) (.196) (.269) (.283) 
Δ Turnout (t-1) * Party Type .007 .009 .019 -.012 -.005 -.013 
 (.013) (.011) (.012) (.010) (.012) (.013) 
Δ Mean Voter Position (t) * Δ Turnout (t-1) *   .071** -.026 -.007 -.013 .032 .077** 
  Party Type (.033) (.034) (.034) (.036) (.039) (.039) 
Constant -.282 -.271 -.289 -.307 -.285 -.276 
 (.203) (.202) (.200) (.211) (.203) (.203) 
N (N group “0”/ N group “1”) 651 651 651 651 651 651 
R-squared .199 .199 .202 .199 .198 .201 
  
 ***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1. Two-way clustered standard errors in parentheses. Country fixed effects, control variables, and lagged dependent variable not shown. 
Information on the operationalization of the different party categories can be found in the Supporting Information. 
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indicates that the marginal effect is only significant for centrist parties after a previous decrease 
in turnout. The estimated effect of responsiveness to the mean voter for extreme parties is not 
statistically significant across the whole range of the change in turnout in the previous election. 
In total, these additional analyses lend considerable support to the Declining Turnout 
Hypothesis. With few exceptions, such as with challenger and extreme parties, the idea of 




We have conducted a number of robustness tests to make sure that our findings are not 
due to decisions related to modelling strategies or to the operationalization of the variables of 
interest. We investigated whether the findings are dependent on modelling decisions. Table A4 
in the Appendix presents a number of alternative specifications. First, we tested whether adding 
party-fixed effects or omitting fixed effects change the results (Models 1 and 2). Second, we 
omitted the lagged dependent variable to investigate whether potential Nickell bias influences 
the results (Model 3) and use lagged levels of the dependent variable as left-right shifts might 
be restricted by the party’s “starting point” on the left-right scale (Model 4). Next, applying 
clustered standard errors with a reduced number of clusters might unexpectedly deflate the 
standard errors. For that reason, we run additional models for which we use only party-
clustered (Model 5), only election-clustered (Model 6), and no clustered standard errors (Model 
7). The parameter estimates for each of these model specifications continue to support the 
central conclusion that we report.  
Additional robustness analyses have also been reported in the Supplementary 
information. We estimate parameters for: models in which parties’ left-right shifts are based 
on a bipolar measure (Laver and Budge 1992) rather than a logit-transformed scale (Table A4, 
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Model 8); an error correction model (Table A5); low and high turnout contexts in Table A6 
(see, respectively, Dreyer and Bauer 2019; Hooghe, Dassonnville, and Oser 2019); that account 
for trending (Table A7); jackknife analyses (Figure A4); models that estimate the mean voter 
position based on different “windows” before the election in which public opinion was 
collected (Table A8); omitting observations for which materials other than manifestos (e.g., 
party bloc programs) were used to estimate party positions (Table A9); models that address 
very small changes in public opinion (Table A10); models that control for several additional 
independent variables that potentially influence turnout and party responsiveness 
simultaneously, including globalization, competitiveness, and polarization (Table A11); and, 
following Ferland (2020; see also Adams et al. 2004), models that control for the direction of 




One reason why voter turnout is considered a main indicator of a healthy democracy is 
that it is thought to enhance elite responsiveness to public opinion (e.g. Powell 1986). The 
contribution of this study is to show that decreases in turnout are important because they 
motivate greater party responsiveness in future elections. If abstention signals dissatisfaction, 
it is potentially a positive finding for the democracies in our sample that parties are more 
responsive to the mean voter position after an election with relatively low turnout. On the other 
hand, when citizens do not turn out, and elites do not respond this would then signal concern 
for democracy. We find that parties in established democracies do respond to decreasing 
turnout, by increasing their responsiveness to the median voter in the following election.  
The finding that declines in aggregate levels of turnout are associated with increases 
in levels of party responsiveness within these democracies raises several interesting questions 
for future research. Our sample of democracies is limited in that we examine only established 
democracies. Newer democracies may not exhibit similar patterns. There is also an issue that 
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party responsiveness may influence turnout. Although the analyses below are based on 
previous changes in voter turnout, a thorough exploration of how responsiveness can affect 
voter turnout is an important next step. Future studies will also analyze how changes in 
turnout condition government policy responsiveness to the mean voter position (see Powell 
2000; Soroka and Wlezien 2010), and whether relatively low turnout motivates future 
governments to respond to the median voter position.22  
Furthermore, there are a number of additional conditional effects worth exploring. If 
parties are sensitive to the median voter after an election with decreasing turnout, an 
extension of the Downsian model might suggest that our findings would increase in 
disproportional electoral systems or party systems that feature only two parties which have 
been argued to be more sensitive to the median voter position (Cox 1990; see also Dow 2001, 
2011). Parties’ organizational structures may also matter for party responsiveness in contexts 
of decreasing turnout. The research that follows will examine whether internally divided 
democratic parties (Lehrer 2012; Schumacher et al. 2013) exhibit less responsiveness to the 
median after decreasing turnout, because party leadership is more constrained by party 
membership.   
Our findings have important implications for literature concerned with unequal 
participation. While declining voter turnout is associated with increasingly unequal 
participation of lower and upper socio-economic groups (Schäfer and Schwander 2019; Solt 
2008), our analysis suggests that decreasing turnout is driven by voters who position 
themselves at the center of the voter distribution. It remains an important task for future 
research to link these two different findings. A related extension will evaluate whether it is an 
 
22 Hooghe, Dassonneville, and Oser (2019) report that voter turnout enhances government policy responsiveness 
to the median voter. Follow up studies will thus focus on temporal effects and how government policy responds 
to decreases in turnout over time. 
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effective electoral strategy for political parties to respond to the median voter position after a 
decline in turnout. 
This study examines the intuition that enhanced turnout benefits democracy because it 
motivates elite responsiveness. Our longitudinal findings suggest that this is the case, just not 
quite how analysts of democracy might assume. We find that decreasing turnout in an election 
enhances political party responsiveness to the median voter in the next election. Future research 
will examine additional conditions for how turnout influences elite responsiveness to public 
opinion. We hope that it will not overlook the possibility that a decrease in turnout will enhance 
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Table A1: Citizen Ideology, Turnout, and Changes in Turnout Individual-Level  
Analyses (Full Models) 
 
 DV: Turnout (Individual-Level) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Gender [Base: Male]  .005  .004 
  (.057)  (.057) 
Age  .078***  .078*** 
  (.011)  (.011) 
Age (squared)  -.001***  -.001*** 
  (.000)  (.000) 
Education: Prim./Lower Sec.   .362***  .362*** 
    [Base: No Education]  (.112)  (.111) 
Education: Higher Sec.   .578***  .577*** 
  (.117)  (.115) 
Education: Post-Sec.  .713***  .710*** 
  (.130)  (.129) 
Education: University   1.029***  1.028*** 
  (.139)  (.138) 
Union Member  .267***  .268*** 
  (.058)  (.059) 
Household Income (Quintiles)  .148***  .148*** 
  (.025)  (.025) 
Unemployed [Base: Employed]  -.418***  -.416*** 
  (.159)  (.159) 
No Satisfaction Dem. [1-4]  -.384***  -.383*** 
  (.076)  (.076) 
Left-Right Extremism [0-6] .090*** .102*** .073*** .088*** 
 (.025) (.021) (.023) (.020) 
Δ Turnout   .071*** .061** 
   (.026) (.025) 
Left-Right Ext. *Δ Turnout   -.012** -.010** 
   (.005) (.004) 
Constant 2.059*** -.365 2.115*** -.314 
 (.180) (.467) (.179) (.472) 
     
N Countries 13 13 13 13 
N Country-Years 42 42 42 42 
Var(Countries) .268 .140 .248 .137 
 (.208) (.124) (.174) (.104) 
Var(Country-Years) .271*** .295*** .230*** .265*** 
 (.090) (.093) (.062) (.078) 
N 48442 48442 48442 48442 
Log likelihood -16103.1 -15099.0 -16092.9 -15092.1 
     
Note: ***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1 
Data: CSES IMD and CSES 5. Sample and demographic weights used. 
Left-Right Extremism: Distance to rounded mean voter position. 
Countries included: Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, 






Table A2: Replication of Table A1 with Binary Indicator for Centrist Voters 
 
 DV: Turnout (Individual-Level) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Gender [Base: Male]  .009  .008 
  (.057)  (.057) 
Age  .078***  .078*** 
  (.011)  (.011) 
Age (squared)  -.001***  -.001*** 
  (.000)  (.000) 
Education: Prim./Lower Sec.   .351***  .350*** 
     [Base: No Education]  (.110)  (.109) 
Education: Higher Sec.   .562***  .559*** 
  (.117)  (.116) 
Education: Post-Sec.  .698***  .693*** 
  (.130)  (.129) 
Education: University   1.006***  1.004*** 
  (.138)  (.137) 
Union Member  .274***  .274*** 
  (.058)  (.058) 
Household Income (Quintiles)  .147***  .147*** 
  (.025)  (.025) 
Unemployed [Base: Employed]  -.413**  -.411** 
  (.161)  (.161) 
No Satisfaction Dem. [1-4]  -.379***  -.379*** 
  (.077)  (.077) 
Left-Right Extremism [0-1 vs. 2-6] .314*** .327*** .281*** .299*** 
 (.073) (.066) (.066) (.061) 
Δ Turnout   .064** .055** 
   (.027) (.026) 
Left-Right Ext. *Δ Turnout   -.024** -.019** 
   (.011) (.010) 
Constant 2.063*** -.344 2.108*** -.302 
 (.180) (.470) (.177) (.472) 
     
N Countries 13 13 13 13 
N Country-Years 42 42 42 42 
Var(Countries) .265 .139 .244 .135 
 (.209) (.125) (.174) (.105) 
Var(Country-Years) .270*** . 294 *** . 228*** .263*** 
 (.090) (.093) (.061) (.078) 
N 48442 48442 48442 48442 
Log likelihood -16085.1 -15090.7 -16078.9 -15068.2 
     
Note: ***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1 
Data: CSES IMD and CSES 5. Sample and demographic weights used. 
Left-Right Extremism: Distance to rounded mean voter position. 
Countries included: Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Ireland, 







Figure A1: Predicted Probabilities of Voting Based on Individual-Level Analyses 
 (Table A2)
 

















Austria  GRÜNE: The Greens  10  Challenger  
 SPÖ: Austrian Social Democratic Party  30  Dominant  
 ÖVP: Austrian People’s Party  50  Dominant  
 FPÖ: Austrian Freedom Party  70  Dominant since 1983  
Denmark  SF: Socialist People’s Party  20  Dominant since 2011  
 VS: Left Socialist Party  20  Challenger  
 EL: Red-Green Unity List  20  Challenger  
 DKP: Danish Communist Party  20  Challenger  
 SD: Social Democratic Party  30  Dominant  
 Liberal Alliance  40  Challenger  
 RV: Danish Social-Liberal Party  40  Dominant  
 V: Liberals  40  Dominant  
 K: Christian Democrats  
   (also KrF: Christian People’s Party)  
50 Dominant since 1981 
 KF: Conservative People’s Party  60  Dominant  
 CD: Centre Democrats  60  Dominant since 1981  
 FP: Progress Party  70  Challenger  
 DF: Danish People’s Party  70  Challenger  
 RF: Justice Party  95  Dominant  
Finland  VL: Green Union  10  Dominant  
 VAS: Left Wing Alliance  20  Dominant  
 SSDP: Finnish Social Democrats  30  Dominant  
 KD: Christian Democrats in Finland  50  Dominant  
 KK: National Coalition  60  Dominant  
 PS: True Finns  70  Dominant  
 SK: Finnish Centre  80  Dominant  
 RKP/SFP: Swedish People’s Party  90  Dominant  
France  EÉLV: Europe Ecology - The Greens  
   (also Les Verts: The Greens)  
10 Dominant since 1997 
 PCF: French Communist Party  
  (also FDG: Left Front)  
20 Dominant 
 PS: Socialist Party  30  Dominant  
 Union for a New Majority - Conservatives/Gaullists  60  Dominant  
 RPR: Rally for the Republic  
  (also Union for a New Majority - Gaullists)  
60 Dominant 
 MoDem: Democratic Movement  
  (also UDF: Union for French Democracy)  
60 Dominant 
 The Republicans  
  (also UMP: Union for a Popular Movement)  
60 Dominant 
 FN: National Front  70  Challenger  
Germany  
90/Greens: Alliance‘90/Greens  
  (also Greens/90: Greens/Alliance‘90)  
10  Dominant since 1998  
 
LINKE: The Left  
  (also L-PDS: The Left. Party of Democratic  
  Socialism; PDS: Party of Democratic Socialism)  
20 Challenger 
 SPD: Social Democratic Party of Germany  30  Dominant  
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 FDP: Free Democratic Party  40  Dominant  
 CDU/CSU: Christian Democratic Union/Christian  
  Social Union  
50 Dominant 
Greece  KKE: Communist Party of Greece  20  Dominant since 1989  
 SYRIZA: Coalition of the Radical Left  
  (also: Synaspismos) 
20 Dominant since 1989 
 PASOK: Panhellenic Socialist Movement  30  Dominant  
 ND: New Democracy  50  Dominant  
 ANEL: Independent Greeks  70  Challenger  
 XA: Golden Dawn  70  Challenger  
Ireland  Greens: Green Party  10  Dominant since 2007  
 WP: Workers’ Party  20  Challenger  
 SF: We Ourselves  20  Challenger  
 Labour: Labour Party  30  Dominant  
 PD: Progressive Democrats  40  Dominant since 1989  
 Family of the Irish  50  Dominant  
 Soldiers of Destiny  60  Dominant  
Italy  FdV: Green Federation  10  Dominant since 1993  
 
DS: Democrats of the Left  
  (also PDS: Democratic Party of the Left;  
  PCI: Italian Communist Party)  
20 Dominant 
 PRC: Communist Refoundation Party  20  Dominant since 1996  
 PSDI: Italian Democratic Socialist Party  30  Dominant  
 PSI: Italian Socialist Party  30  Dominant  
 
Pannella-Sgarbi List  
  (also Pannella-Riformatori List;  
  LP: Pannella List; PR: Radical Party)  
30 Challenger 
 PD: Democratic Party  30  Dominant  
 PLI: Italian Liberal Party  40  Dominant  
 PRI: Italian Republican Party  40  Dominant  
 PPI: Italian Popular Party  
  (also DC: Christian Democrats)  
50 Dominant 
 UdC: Union of the Center  50  Dominant since 2013  
 FI: Go Italy  60  Dominant  
 
AN: National Alliance  
  (also MSI-DN: Italian Social Movement-National   
  Right)  
70 Dominant since 2001 
 L: League  
  (also LN: Northern League)  
70 Dominant 
 IdV: List Di Pietro - Italy of Values  95  Dominant  
Netherlands  GL: Green Left  10  Challenger  
 SP: Socialist Party  20  Challenger  
 PvdA: Labour Party  30  Dominant  
 PPR: Radical Political Party  30  Dominant  
 VVD: People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy  40  Dominant  
 D’66: Democrats‘66  40  Dominant  
 GPV: Reformed Political League  50  Challenger  
 RPF: Reformatory Political Federation  50  Challenger  
 CU: Christian Union  50  Dominant since 2006  
 CDA: Christian Democratic Appeal  50  Dominant  
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 PVV: Party of Freedom  70  Challenger  
 SGP: Reformed Political Party  95  Challenger  
 PvdD: Party for the Animals  95  Challenger  
Portugal  PCP: Portuguese Communist Party  20  Challenger  
 BE: Left Bloc  20  Challenger  
 PS: Socialist Party  30  Dominant  
 CDS-PP: Social Democratic Center-Popular Party  
  (also CDS: Social Democratic Center Party)  
50 Dominant 
 PSD: Social Democratic Party  60  Dominant  
Spain  IU: United Left  20  Challenger  
 PSOE: Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party  30  Dominant  
 CDS: Centre Democrats  50  Challenger  
 PP: People's Party  60  Dominant  
 PNV/EAJ: Basque Nationalist Party  90  Challenger  
 ERC: Catalan Republican Left  90  Challenger  
 PAR: Aragonese Party  90  Challenger  
 CiU: Convergence and Union  90  Challenger  
 EE: Basque Left  90  Challenger  
 CC-PNC: Canarian Coalit./Canarian Nationalist P.  
  (also CC: Canarian Coalition)  
90 Challenger 
 EA: Basque Solidarity  90  Challenger  
 BNG: Galician Nationalist Bloc  90  Challenger  
Sweden  MP: Green Ecology Party  10  Dominant since 2014  
 V: Left Party  20  Challenger  
 SAP: Social Democratic Labour Party  30  Dominant  
 L: Liberals  
  (also FP: Liberal People’s Party)  
40 Dominant 
 Kd: Christian Democrats  50  Dominant  
 MSP: Moderate Coalition Party  60  Dominant  
 SD: Sweden Democrats  70  Challenger  
 CP: Centre Party  80  Dominant  
UK  Labour: Labour Party  30  Dominant  
 Liberal Party  40  Challenger  
 LibDems: Liberal Democrats  40  Dominant since 2010  
 Conservatives: Conservative Party  60  Dominant  
 UUP: Ulster Unionist Party  60  Challenger  
 SNP: Scottish National Party  90  Challenger  
 DUP: Democratic Unionist Party  90  Challenger  
Notes: The parties participated in at least three consecutive elections according to the MARPOR dataset. In a 
few instances, party codes were merged in the MARPOR scheme (such as for the German Left Party/PDS, the 
French Communist Party/Left Front, or the Greek Coalition of the Radical Left) to maximize the time series. 
Party family classification according to the MARPOR coding scheme: 10 = Green parties, 20 = Communist 
parties, 30 = Social Democratic parties, 40 = Liberal parties, 50 = Christian Democratic parties, 60 = 






Figure A2: Marginal Effects Plot (Hainmueller et al. 2019)
 








Party Type Empirical Analyses 
 
We coded the different party types as follows.  
 
First, following De Vries and Hobolt (2020), parties were coded as “dominant” from the time 
they first formally participated in a national government (see also Table A3). 
 
Second, parties were coded as niche parties that belong to the communist, nationalist, 
ecological, or ethno-territorial party family according to the MARPOR coding scheme. In 
few cases our coding deviates from the MARPOR scheme. We classify Sinn Fein (Ireland) as 
a radical left party, the True Finns (Finland) and the Progress Party (Denmark) as radical 
right parties, and the Democratic Party of the Left (Italy) as a social democratic party. All 
other parties were coded as “mainstream” (see also Table A3). 
 
Third, opposition parties were all parties that did not formally participate in a government at 
the beginning of the legislative period preceding the election in question. 
 
Fourth, vote losing parties are those parties which experienced a negative vote change 
between elections t-2 and t-1.  
 
Fifth, small parties are those parties that gained less than 10% of the national vote in the 
previous election. 
 
Sixth, political parties were coded as extreme if their left-right position deviated more than 





Figure A3: Marginal Effects Plots for Different Party Types (based on Table 3) 
 



























Table A4: Alternative Model Specifications 
 
 Δ L-R (Logit) Δ L-R (Bipolar) 






SE Alt. DV 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Δ Party Left-Right  -.431*** -.380***   -.393*** -.393*** -.393*** -.415*** 
  (t-1) (.077) (.068)   (.068) (.050) (.036) (.058) 
Party Left-Right (t-1)    -.303***     
    (.064)     
Δ MV Position (t) .283* .313** .287* .220* .292** .292** .292** 4.844 
 (.155) (.141) (.151) (.129) (.118) (.135) (.119) (3.203) 
Δ Turnout (t-1) .003 .002 -.006 -.005 .004 .004 .004 .034 
 (.008) (.008) (.008) (.006) (.004) (.008) (.008) (.164) 
Δ Party Vote Share  .297 .013 -.049 -.121 .040 .040 .040 5.162 
  (t-1) (.367) (.392) (.422) (.342) (.480) (.469) (.603) (9.858) 
Party Opposition .087 .016 -.032 -.074 .010 .010 .010 .265 
  Status (t-1) (.062) (.057) (.055) (.054) (.048) (.060) (.061) (.979) 
Δ Globalization (t) -.019 -.014 -.022 -.010 -.021 -.021 -.021 -.643 
 (.027) (.023) (.026) (.021) (.019) (.023) (.017) (.523) 
Δ GDP per Capita  -.472 -.153 -.147 -.157 -.246 -.246 -.246 -5.280 
  (log, t) (.337) (.278) (.273) (.221) (.206) (.278) (.199) (5.633) 
Δ MV (t) *  -.084*** -.071*** -.061*** -.049*** -.075*** -.075*** -.075*** -1.360** 
  Δ Turnout (t-1) (.029) (.023) (.021) (.016) (.020) (.026) (.026) (.583) 
Constant .277*** .002 -.209 -.252* -.286*** -.286 -.286* -6.238 
 (.057) (.062) (.222) (.153) (.054) (.247) (.149) (4.712) 
N 651 651 686 686 651 651 651 651 
R-squared .281 .174 .036 .190 .196 .196 .196 .196 
Notes: ***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1 
Two-way clustered standard errors in parentheses (Models 1-4, and 8). 
FE = Fixed Effects; LDV = Lagged Dependent Variable; SE = Standard Errors. The dependent variable D Party 
Position (t) is defined as the difference in a party’s left-right position at election (t), from its position at the previous 
election at (t-1). The independent variables are defined in the text. Two-way clustered standard errors are reported 
in parentheses (Models 1-4, and 8). Country fixed effects not shown (Models 3-8). 
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To address temporal dynamics, the parameters of an error correction model specification 
were estimated for short- and long-term effects of the covariates. The results support the 
findings of the main model that turnout changes affect mainstream party responsiveness in 
the following election, but a longer-term relationship between turnout and responsiveness 
was not identified. 
 
 
Table A5: Error Correction Model of Changes in Parties’ Left-Right Positions 
 
 DV: Δ Party Left-Right Position  
Party Left-Right Position (t-1) -.305*** 
 (.065) 
Δ Mean Voter Position (t) .258* 
 (.153) 
Mean Voter Position (t-1) .455 
 (.924) 
Δ Turnout (t-1) -.005 
 (.008) 
Turnout (t-2) .030 
 (.058) 
Δ Party Vote Share (t-1) .048 
 (.365) 
Party Vote Share (t-2) .242 
 (.224) 
Party Government Status (t-1) -.042 
 (.063) 
Δ Globalization (t) -.022 
 (.024) 
Globalization (t-1) -.019 
 (.012) 
Δ GDP per Capita (log, t) -.587 
 (.364) 
GDP per Capita (log, t-1) .001 
 (.129) 
Δ Mean Voter Position (t) * Δ Turnout (t-1) -.052*** 
 (.016) 






***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1 






It may be that low or high voter turnout contexts matter for party responsiveness (see, 
respectively, Dreyer and Bauer 2019; Hooghe, Dassonnville, and Oser 2019).  Models that 
include an interaction for low and high turnout environments confirm that turnout levels do 
not condition the influence of changes in turnout on party responsiveness. 
 
 
Table A6: Models Stratified by Turnout Context (Low and High Turnout Elections) 
 DV: Δ Party Left-Right Position  
Δ Party left Right Position (t-1) -.398*** 
 (.069) 
Δ Mean Voter Position (t) .286 
 (.244) 
Δ Turnout (t-1) -.007 
 (.009) 
Δ Party Vote Share (t-1) .023 
 (.366) 
Party Government Status (t-1) .014 
 (.050) 
Δ Globalization (t) -.022 
 (.025) 
Δ GDP per Capita (log, t) -.338 
 (.291) 
High Turnount (t-1) (Dummy) .164 
 (.109) 
Δ Mean Voter Position (t) * Δ Turnout (t-1) -.069** 
 (.031) 
Δ Mean Voter Position (t) * High Turnout (t-1) .038 
 (.304) 
Δ Turnout (t-1) * High Turnout (t-1) .015 
 (.019) 






***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1 





Table A7: Including Decade Dummy Variables 
 DV: Δ Party Left-Right Position 
 Model 1 Model 2 
∆	Party Left-Right Position (t-1) -.394*** -.398*** 
 (.072) (.071) 
∆	Mean Voter Position (t) .383** .286* 
 (.154) (.152) 
∆	Turnout (t-1) .008 .004 
 (.008) (.007) 
∆	Party Vote Share (t-1) .075 .034 
 (.390) (.379) 
Party Government Status (t-1) .001 .008 
 (.048) (.047) 
∆	Globalization (t) -.018 -.018 
 (.029) (.028) 
∆	GDP per Capita (log, t) -.627** -.645** 
 (.319) (.299) 
1970-1979 [Base: 2000-2009] .363** .357** 
 (.174) (.171) 
1980-1989 .204* .180 
 (.123) (.119) 
1990-1999 .054 .063 
 (.111) (.113) 
2010-2019 -.078 -.098 
 (.116) (.116) 
∆	Mean Voter Position (t) * ∆	Turnout (t-1)  -.075*** 
  (.023) 
Constant -.263 -.226 
 (.235) (.223) 
N 651 651 
R-squared .198 .208 
***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1 














The possibility that the results are driven by a single country case was checked. We 
conducted jackknife analyses, and Figure A4 shows the corresponding results. Although the 
base term becomes insignificant in several cases, the size of the coefficient remains stable. 
More importantly, the interaction term is – in all cases – negative and statistically significant 
confirming the conditioning effect of turnout change on party responsiveness. We can thus 
conclude that our results are not driven by a single country in our data set.  
  
 
Figure A4: Jackknife Analyses
 









With regard to the public opinion measure, we considered only those surveys that were 
conducted at maximum one year before the election in question. We lack the information as 
to when the single manifestos were drafted. However, it might be possible that public opinion 
data that has been collected too far ahead of an election affects the accuracy of our estimates. 
In order to account only for survey data that has been collected during the campaign periods, 
we have re-run the model while limiting the data window to nine and six months. This did 
not affect the results of the analysis in substantial ways. 
 
 
Table A8: Alternative Public Opinion Windows for the Eurobarometer Surveys 
 
 DV: Δ Party Left-Right Position 
 9 Months Window     6 Months Window 
 Model 1 Model 2     Model 3 Model 4 
Δ Party Left-Right Position (t-1) -.391*** -.393*** -.391*** -.393*** 
 (.071) (.069) (.073) (.071) 
Δ Mean Voter Position (t) .377*** .288** .375** .287** 
 (.146) (.141) (.150) (.144) 
Δ Turnout (t-1) .008 .004 .008 .004 
 (.008) (.007) (.008) (.007) 
Δ Party Vote Share (t-1) .084 .046 .082 .040 
 (.376) (.367) (.374) (.365) 
Party Government Status (t-1) .005 .011 .0001 .007 
 (.051) (.050) (.051) (.050) 
Δ Globalization (t) -.025 -.021 -.025 -.021 
 (.025) (.025) (.025) (.025) 
Δ GDP per Capita (log, t) -.254 -.266 -.264 -.275 
 (.305) (.284) (.308) (.287) 
Δ Mean Voter Position (t) *  -.074***  -.074*** 
Δ Turnout (t-1)  (.025)  (.025) 
Constant -.311 -.285 -.309 -.282 
 (.215) (.203) (.215) (.202) 
N 648 648 644 644 
R-squared .186 .196 .183 .193 
***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1 




The MARPOR data set contains several election manifestos which were not official programs 
published by the party. Instead, in these rare instances, the estimates are based on 
combinations of other sources (e.g., party bloc programs). To ensure that the results are not 
mainly due to these less reliable position scores, we re-run the analysis while restricting the 
observation to actual programs of parties. Again, this does not alter our results. 
 
 
Table A9: Omitting Parties with Estimated Manifestos Scores 
 DV: Δ Party Left-Right Position 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Δ Party Left-Right Position (t-1) -.376*** -.380*** 
 (.057) (.056) 
Δ Mean Voter Position (t) .404*** .313** 
 (.153) (.145) 
Δ Turnout (t-1) .006 .002 
 (.008) (.008) 
Δ Party Vote Share (t-1) .469 .406 
 (.408) (.404) 
Party Government Status (t-1) .007 .015 
 (.051) (.050) 
Δ Globalization (t) -.025 -.021 
 (.028) (.027) 
Δ GDP per Capita (log, t) -.342 -.343 
 (.339) (.314) 
Δ Mean Voter Position (t) *  -.080*** 
Δ Turnout (t-1)  (.027) 
Constant -.299 -.272 
 (.215) (.202) 
N 596 596 
R-squared .177 .189 
***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1 
Notes: Two-way clustered standard errors in parentheses. Country fixed effects not shown.  




Mean voter shifts are not always substantial in size and might rather be the result of some 
measurement error. It might thus be possible that the presented results are driven by these 
marginal shifts in public opinion. Running the models while forcing all public opinion shifts 
that are smaller than one standard deviation of the Mean Voter Position change variable to 
zero, however, does again not change the results substantially. Similarly, our results are not 
affected if we exclude these cases from the analysis. 
 
 
Table A10: Addressing Minor Changes in the Mean Voter Position 
 
 DV: Δ Party Left-Right Position 
 Minor 
changes = 0 
Minor  
changes excluded 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Δ Party Left-Right Position (t-1) -.388*** -.393*** -.477*** -.485*** 
 (.070) (.068) (.113) (.105) 
Δ Mean Voter Position (t) .290* .176 .351** .194 
 (.161) (.145) (.161) (.159) 
Δ Turnout (t-1) .009 .007 .009 .008 
 (.008) (.007) (.010) (.009) 
Δ Party Vote Share (t-1) .059 .004 .032 -.113 
 (.360) (.347) (.848) (.755) 
Party Government Status (t-1) .007 .012 .054 .052 
 (.052) (.051) (.099) (.094) 
Δ Globalization (t) -.024 -.021 -.029 -.029 
 (.024) (.024) (.020) (.027) 
Δ GDP per Capita (log, t) -.175 -.192 -.088 -.084 
 (.300) (.280) (.181) (.183) 
Δ Mean Voter Position (t) * Δ Turnout (t-1)  -.078***  -.079** 
  (.026)  (.035) 
Constant -.335 -.304 -.217 -.167 
 (.214) (.206) (.281) (.257) 
N 651 651 174 174 
R-squared .178 .187 .414 .438 
***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1 




We control for alternative factors that might both affect changes in turnout as well as party 
responsiveness. These factors are: globalization; election competitiveness; party polarization; 
and the vote share of extreme parties. We interact these variables with the change in the mean 
voter position to investigate whether and to which extent our relationship of interest is 
affected. The values for changes in globalization are again provided by the KOF 
Globalization Index (Sturm, Haelg, and Gygli 2018). Election competitiveness is 
operationalized as the difference in the vote share between the strongest and the second 
strongest party in the previous election. We measure party polarization as the absolute 
distance on the left-right scale between the two strongest parties in the previous election. The 
vote share of extreme parties at t-1 is the sum of the vote share of the radical left and radical 
right parties. 
Table A11: Controlling for Conditioning Variables 
 DV: Δ Party Left-Right Position 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Δ Party Left-Right Position (t-1) -.392*** -.394*** -.391*** -.396*** -.396*** 
 (.067) (.068) (.070) (.070) (.070) 
Δ Mean Voter Position (t) .565*** .348*** .272** .291** .573*** 
 (.165) (.134) (.136) (.143) (.148) 
Δ Turnout (t-1) .006 .006 .004 .003 .007 
 (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) 
Δ Party Vote Share (t-1) .025 .082 .114 .095 .198 
 (.386) (.345) (.367) (.371) (.383) 
Party Opposition Status (t-1) .010 .010 .025 .013 .027 
 (.051) (.048) (.051) (.049) (.051) 
Δ Globalization (t) -.021 -.020 -.028 -.018 -.024 
 (.023) (.024) (.024) (.025) (.022) 
Δ GDP per Capita (log, t) -.345 -.293 -.260 -.241 -.376 
 (.289) (.270) (.260) (.286) (.277) 
Δ Mean Voter Position (t) * Δ Globalization (t) -.154***    -.141*** 
 (.052)    (.050) 
Δ Competitiveness (t-1)  .428   .315 
  (.440)   (.457) 
Δ Mean Voter Position (t) * Δ Competitiveness (t-1)  3.439*   3.338* 
  (1.876)   (1.959) 
Δ MP Pos. Distance (t-1)   -.052  -.059 
   (.041)  (.038) 
Δ Mean Voter Position (t) * Δ MP Pos. Distance (t-1)   -.417**  -.383** 
   (.198)  (.183) 
Δ Vote Share Extreme Parties (t-1)    .686 .735 
    (.689) (.658) 
Δ Mean Voter Position (t) * Δ Vote Share Extreme Parties (t-1)    -1.490 -1.410 
    (3.183) (3.169) 
Δ Mean Voter Position (t) * Δ Turnout (t-1) -.081*** -.056** -.078*** -.074*** -.063** 
 (.022) (.025) (.025) (.026) (.026) 
Constant -.243 -.283 -.344* -.314 -.328 
 (.201) (.214) (.205) (.221) (.230) 
N 651 651 651 651 651 
R-squared .204 .203 .206 .198 .221 
***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1, Two-way clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
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Tests for Harmful and Benign Mean Voter Shifts 
 
We follow Adams et al. (2004) and define harmful and benign public opinion changes based 
on the direction and magnitude of mean voter shifts with respect to parties’ core ideologies. 
When mean voter shifts away from a focal party, this is labelled a “harmful” mean voter 
shift, and when the mean voter shifts toward the party this is labelled “benign”. In a first step, 
we consider only those public opinion shifts that are larger than one standard deviation of the 
mean voter shift variable. Thus, we consider only those elections in which large public 
opinion shifts occur. All other elections are coded as “non-shifting”. Second, we categorize 
political parties based on the core ideology that positions them either as clearly to the left or 
the right of the mean voter. Radical left, Green, and Social Democratic parties form the group 
of left parties and Conservative, Christian Democratic, and Radical Right parties were 
classified as right parties.23 Thus, left parties were confronted with harmful public opinion 
changes if the Mean Voter position shifted to the right and with benign public opinion shifts 
if the Mean Voter shifted to the left. The opposite applies to right parties. 
We evaluate whether political parties respond to benign and harmful public opinion 
shifts after turnout decline in Table A12. Model 1 includes all political parties, and Model 2 
includes only dominant parties following the classification by De Vries and Hobolt (2020). 
Both models suggest that political parties predominantly respond to harmful public opinion 
shifts. The interaction terms between harmful mean voter shifts and turnout changes are 
significant and negative. At the same time, the interaction terms for benign mean voter shifts 
are close to zero, which is in line with findings presented by Ferland (2020). Finally, the 
results continue to support our core hypothesis, because party responsiveness to harmful 
public opinion shifts is estimated to increase if turnout has declined in the previous election. 
 
 
23 We exclude Liberal, Agrarian, and Regional parties as harmful and benign public opinion shifts cannot be 
clearly defined for these party families. 
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Table A12: Harmful and Benign Mean Voter Shifts and Party Responsiveness 
 DV: Δ Party Left-Right Position 
 All parties Dominant parties 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Δ Party Left-Right Position (t-1) -.404*** -.434*** 
 (.085) (.111) 
Δ Turnout (t-1) .023 .028 
 (.016) (.019) 
Δ Party Vote Share (t-1) .121 .548 
 (.432) (.489) 
Government (t-1) .026 .041 
 (.055) (.062) 
Δ Globalization (t) -.026 -.032 
 (.025) (.029) 
Δ GDP (log, t) -.183 -.188 
 (.308) (.308) 
Harmful MV Shift -.031 -.070 
 (.140) (.157) 
Benign MV Shift .059 .117 
 (.128) (.130) 
Harmful MV Shift * Δ Turnout (t-1) -.069** -.073** 
 (.032) (.036) 
Benign MV Shift * Δ Turnout (t-1) -.002 -.023 
 (.027) (.027) 
Constant -.417* -.443* 
 (.243) (.252) 
N 496 356 
R-squared .190 .224 
***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1 


















Figure A5: Marginal Effects Plots for Harmful and Benign Mean Voter Shifts, Based on 








In the article, we discuss the possibility that parties influence citizen preferences (Lenz 2012; 
Achen and Bartels 2016). If this is the case, we should find the pattern of voters and parties 
moving together consistently. However, what we find is that citizens and parties systematically 
move together only when turnout decreased in the previous election. Thus, this reversed 
relationship does not appear to be occurring uniformly throughout the countries and time period 
in our data. In addition, we analyze existing data to further explore the issue. Our estimates of 
public opinion in the manuscript, which are based on 12-month windows before the elections, 
could be influenced by surveys fielded during the last four months of an election campaign. In 
Models 1-2 of Table A13 below, we estimate the effect of changes in the mean voter position 
on changes in parties’ left right positions. But in these analyses, we only rely on left-right 
placements from 4-12 months before the election, i.e., estimates of public opinion are from 
before the time that most election manifestos are published. If parties were influencing public 
opinion, we would expect that the estimates of responsiveness would become significantly 
diminished or disappear based on the measures of public opinion 4-12 months prior to the 
election. The coefficient on the conditioning effect of turnout on responsiveness that we report 
in the main table in the article is approximately the same as the estimate in Table A13. In Table 
A13 Model 2, the estimate on the interaction variable (Δ Mean Voter Position (t) * Δ Turnout 
(t-1)) is -.069 compared to -.075 in the article (both of these estimates are statistically 
significant).   
 
Table A13: Analyses of Changes in Party Position, based on Mean Voter (t) Estimates 
from 4 to 12 Months Prior to the Election 
 
 DV: Δ Party Left-Right Position 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Δ Party Left-Right Position (t-1) -.390*** -.395*** 
 (.072) (.071) 
Δ Mean Voter (t) .319** .241 
  [4 to 12 months windows] (.157) (.159) 
Δ Turnout (t-1) .001 -.002 
 (.008) (.008) 
Δ Party Vote Share (t-1) -.115 -.184 
 (.360) (.355) 
Government (t-1) -.015 -.011 
 (.055) (.054) 
Δ Globalization (t) -.028 -.023 
 (.025) (.025) 
Δ GDP (log, t) -.210 -.258 
 (.302) (.293) 
Δ Mean Voter (t) * Δ Turnout (t-1)  -.069** 
  (.029) 
Constant -.381 -.355 
 (.260) (.242) 
N 623 623 
R-squared .182 .189 
***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1 
Two-way clustered standard errors in parentheses. Country fixed effects not shown. 
 
